Can developed economies combat dangerous anthropogenic climate change without near-term reductions from developing economies? by Stephanie T. Waldhoff & Allen A. Fawcett
Climatic Change (2011) 107:635–641
DOI 10.1007/s10584-011-0132-7
LETTER
Can developed economies combat dangerous
anthropogenic climate change without near-term
reductions from developing economies?
A letter
Stephanie T. Waldhoff · Allen A. Fawcett
Received: 12 April 2011 / Accepted: 2 June 2011 / Published online: 6 July 2011
© The Author(s) 2011. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract Developing economy greenhouse gas emissions are growing rapidly rela-
tive to developed economy emissions (Boden et al. 2010) and developing economies
as a group have greater emissions than developed economies. These developments
are expected to continue (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2010), which
has led some to question the effectiveness of emissions mitigation in developed
economies without a commitment to extensive mitigation action from developing
economies. One often heard argument against proposed U.S. legislation to limit
carbon emissions to mitigate climate change is that, without participation from large
developing economies like China and India, stabilizing temperature at 2 degrees
Celsius above preindustrial (United Nations 2009), or even reducing global emissions
levels, would be impossible (Driessen 2009; RPC Energy Facts 2009) or prohibitively
expensive (Clarke et al. 2009). Here we show that significantly delayed action by
rapidly developing countries is not a reason to forgo mitigation efforts in developed
economies. This letter examines the effect of a scenario with no explicit international
climate policy and two policy scenarios, full global action and a developing economy
delay, on the probability of exceeding various global average temperature changes
by 2100. This letter demonstrates that even when developing economies delay
any mitigation efforts until 2050 the effect of action by developed economies will
appreciably reduce the probability of more extreme levels of temperature change.
This paper concludes that early carbon mitigation efforts by developed economies
will considerably affect the distribution over future climate change, whether or not
developing countries begin mitigation efforts in the near term.
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Developing economy greenhouse gas emissions are growing rapidly relative to
developed economy emissions. China has overtaken the United States as the largest
emitter of fossil fuel CO2 to the atmosphere, and developing economies as a
group have greater emissions than developed economies (Boden et al. 2010). These
developments are expected to continue (U.S. Energy Information Administration
2010), which has led some to question the effectiveness of emissions mitigations
in developed economies such as the United States. One often heard argument
against proposed U.S. legislation to limit carbon emissions to mitigate climate
change is that, without participation from large developing economies like China
and India, stabilizing temperature, or even reducing global emissions levels, would
be impossible (Driessen 2009; RPC Energy Facts 2009) or prohibitively expensive.
While it is true that a delay in developing economy action to reduce CO2 emissions
would greatly increase the cost of stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations at any
given level,1 the gains from developed country mitigation—even when developing
economy action is greatly diminished or delayed—are still large. In this paper we
estimate the potential effectiveness of developed country leadership in reducing the
likelihood of observed global mean temperature exceeding 2◦C,2 even if developing
economies delay emissions mitigation efforts until after mid-century. We find that
the effect of early mitigation action on the part of developed economies significantly
reduces the probability of large temperature changes in 2100 while increasing the
probability of lower temperature changes, as compared to a no policy scenario.
This paper examines three scenarios: a scenario with no concerted action to mit-
igate emissions (“No Policy”), a scenario intended to represent full and immediate
global participation in limiting greenhouse gas emissions (“Full Participation”), and
a scenario where all developing economies take no action to mitigate emissions until
2050 (“Developing Economy Delay”).3
The no policy case uses the emissions pathways from the MiniCAM model’s EMF
22 no policy scenario (Calvin et al. 2009). The full participation scenario is based
on the commitments made at the July 2009, Major Economies Forum where, “the
G8 leaders agreed to reduce their emissions 80% or more by 2050 as its share of a
global goal to lower emissions 50% by 2050, acknowledging the broad scientific view
that warming should be limited to no more than two degrees Celsius (White House
2009),” and the caps on emissions from the recently debated Senate American Power
1In the Energy Modeling Forum 22 exercise, Clarke et al. (2009) showed that 12 out of 14
participating models could not achieve stabilization of CO2e concentrations of 450 ppm by the end
of the century when developing countries delayed action until 2030 or later, and in all stabilization
scenarios costs were higher in the delayed participation cases.
2This paper focuses on the probability of a change in observed global mean temperature as a proxy
for the impacts likely to be caused by climate change under specific scenarios. Another part of the
uncertainty stems from the possibility of extreme damages at even moderate levels of temperature
change and the increasing likelihood of catastrophic damages at higher levels of temperature change.
The authors acknowledge the uncertainty over translating changes in temperatures to physical
impacts and economic damages. For examples of the catastrophic damages discussion in the current
literature, see Weitzman (2010).
3The scenarios presented in this letter are from EPA’s 2010 analysis of the American Power Act. For
a complete description of the scenarios, see (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2010).
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Fig. 1 Annual greenhouse gas
emissions under alternate
scenarios
Act (APA), which has a 2050 cap on US emissions that is 83% below 2005 levels
in 2050. Under these assumptions the US, as well as other developed countries, all
reduce emissions to 83% below 2005 levels by 2050. Developing countries adopt
a policy beginning in 2025 that caps emissions at 2015 levels, and linearly reduce
emissions to 26% below 2005 levels by 2050 in order to meet the 50% global
reduction target agreed upon at the Major Economies Forum. In the developing
economy delay scenario, developed economies adopt the same targets as in the
full participation case; however, developing economies do not adopt any climate
policies until 2050, after which their emissions are held constant at 2050 no policy
levels. These stylized scenarios demonstrate alternate levels of emissions that could
occur under many potential futures. Figure 1 depicts the annual greenhouse gas
emissions in each region under these three scenarios, and Table 1 shows the 2010–
2100 cumulative emissions and cumulative abatement demand by region in each
scenario.
Figure 2 shows the approximate probability of observed global mean temperature
changes in 2100, relative to pre-industrial, under no policy, developing economy
delay, and full participation scenarios.4,5 We developed these figures using a simple
climate model, the Model for the Assessment of Greenhouse-gas Induced Climate
Change (MAGICC) 5.3, (Wigley 2011) and the distribution over climate sensitivity
reported by Roe and Baker (2007) truncated (at 10◦C) as implemented by the US
Government in the 2010 Social Cost of Carbon exercise (U.S. Government Intera-
gency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon 2010). These figures demonstrate
the resulting approximate probability of specific ranges of observed global mean
temperature change.
For instance, under the no policy scenario, the probability of attaining the G8 goal
of not exceeding a temperature change in 2100 of 2◦C is approximately 1%. Under
the full global participation scenario this probability increases to 75%. Under the
delayed participation scenario this probability is 11%, an order of magnitude change
4Observed temperature change is that resulting from the concentration levels in a specific year.
5These are similar in style to the MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change
temperature “roulette wheels” developed in 2009 that depict “policy” and “no policy” gambles over
temperature change (Webster et al. 2003). See also http://globalchange.mit.edu/resources/gamble/.
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Table 1 2010–2100 Cumulative greenhouse gas emissions and abatement (GtCO2e)
2010–2100 cumulative GHG emissions 2010–2100 cumulative GHG abatement
Developed Developing Global Developed Developing Global
No policy 1,646 5,284 6,930 – – –
Developing delay 516 4,679 5,195 1,130 606 1,736
Full participation 516 2,120 2,635 1,130 3,165 4,295
from the no policy. Additionally, the probability of remaining between 2◦ and 3◦
above pre-industrial temperatures increases from 29% in the no policy scenario to
47% in the delayed participation scenario. The delay scenario has a near doubling of
the probability of remaining below 3◦ compared to the no policy scenario.
A primary advantage of the probabilistic presentation of observed temperature
changes in Fig. 2 is that, in addition to clearly depicting the chances of meeting the
two degree Celsius target, the risks of observing more extreme temperature changes
are also clear. Much recent discussion around climate policy has involved reducing
the risk of catastrophic or severe climate impacts. Temperature can serve as a useful
proxy for these impacts. The probability of the global mean temperature increase
above preindustrial being 4◦C or greater is about 32% in the no policy case. This
probability is reduced to essentially zero in the full participation case and even in the
case of delayed developing economy action the probability of exceeding 4◦C is cut in
half to approximately 15%. The most extreme outcome, an increase of 6◦ to 8◦C, has
a 4.7% chance of occurring in the no policy scenario, while the probability under the
delayed developing economy action scenario is one eighth as large, at 0.6%.
In all three scenarios, the temperature in 2100 is not stabilized and the observed
change in global mean temperature in 2100 is not equal to the equilibrium change
in global mean temperature. There are two reasons for this. First, equilibrium
temperature change (Fig. 3) cannot be achieved until CO2e concentrations, not
just emissions, are constant (CO2e concentrations in each scenario under different
climate sensitivities are shown in Fig. 4). While the G8 international goals stabilize
global greenhouse gas emissions at 50% below 2005 levels, CO2e concentrations, and
therefore temperature, are not stabilized. Second, even if concentrations were stabi-
lized, the inertia in ocean temperatures causes the equilibrium global mean surface
temperature change to lag behind the observed global mean surface temperature
Fig. 2 Probability of observed temperature change in 2100 under alternate mitigation scenarios
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Fig. 3 Probability of long-term equilibrium temperature change assuming radiative forcing held
constant at 2100 levels under alternate mitigation scenarios
change by as much as 500 years. Even when CO2e concentrations are stabilized,
observed temperatures would continue to rise for centuries before the equilibrium
temperature changes are achieved.
A common practice for calculating the equilibrium temperature change when
using a model that only runs through 2100 is to assume constant radiative forcing
after 2100 (total radiative forcing in each scenario under different climate sensitivities
are shown in Table 2). This may be a reasonable assumption in a policy case,
where the additional post 2100 reductions needed to stabilize radiative forcing could
reasonably be assumed to occur; however, in a no policy case it leads to overly
optimistic results, since very large post 2100 reductions are being assumed in what
is intended as a ‘no policy’ scenario. With these caveats, Fig. 3 depicts the probability
of equilibrium temperature changes committed to in 2100 given the three scenarios
described above, assuming constant radiative forcing in perpetuity for each scenario.
Notably, the equilibrium temperature changes associated with the radiative forcings
in 2100 are much larger than the observed temperature changes in 2100. Under the no
policy scenario there is nearly a 75% probability of equilibrium temperature change
exceeding 4◦C, with a 21% chance of temperature change being greater than 8◦C.
As with the observed temperature changes, the probability of extreme equilibrium
temperature changes are decreased, while the probability of smaller temperature
Fig. 4 CO2e concentrations
through 2100 under alternate
scenarios and climate
sensitivities
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Table 2 Total radiative forcing (W/m2)
RF in 2100 under alternate climate sensitivities
CS = 1.5 CS = 2.5 CS = 3.0 CS = 4.5 CS = 6.0
No policy 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 6.7
Developing delay 4.9 5.1 5.1 5.3 5.4
Full participation 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.8
changes is increased for both the full participation and developing economy delay
scenarios. Under the no policy scenario the probability of staying below a 2◦C
equilibrium temperature change is minute at only 0.03%. Under the full participation
scenario there is 44% chance of staying below 2◦C and even under the delay scenario
this probability is 1.3%. The probability of staying between 2 and 3◦C for equilibrium
temperature change increases to 30% in the full global action scenario and 19% in
the delay scenario from 5.6% in the no policy scenario, an increase of 24 and 13
percentage points, respectively.
We find that early action by the developed countries, even in the absence of
mitigation efforts by developing economies prior to 2050, has a strong positive impact
on the distribution over observed temperature outcomes in 2100 relative to the no
policy case. There is a clear increase in the probability of achieving the G8 target of a
temperature change of less than 2◦C under the developing economy delay scenario,
as compared to the no policy scenario. We also find that the delay scenario halves
the probability of exceeding the most extreme temperature changes, greater than
10◦C, and reduces the probability of temperature changes greater than 6◦C by 15
percentage points, from 38% to 23%.
A key contribution of this work is the clear presentation of changes in temperature
probability distributions over alternate scenarios, clearly demonstrating the large
reductions in the risks of more extreme temperature change under mitigation
scenarios, as compared with a no policy scenario. We show that these reductions in
the risk of the worst outcomes are greatly reduced even under a scenario that models
a delay in developing economy participation. While delay in mitigation efforts by
developing economies is not an ideal outcome—the greatest changes are seen when
the countries all begin mitigation efforts immediately—it is clear that the potential
for this delay should no longer be used as a reason to prevent mitigation action in
developed economies.
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